USS Clueless - Outside involvement
     
     
 

Stardate 20020215.1336

(Captain's log): Part IV of my analysis of the Iraq war.

Part I: Iranian intervention
Part II: The problem of air supremacy and general Iraqi tactics
Part III: Axis of attack
Part IV: Development of the battlefield
Part V: Why not like in Afghanistan?

If full-scale war begins in Iraq, there is the possibility of outsiders getting involved. By far the most likely source of such involvement is Syria. Syria has been friendly to Iraq and it shares a very long border, and it is no friend of the US. Any attack by the US originating in Turkey would have its right flank on Syrian territory and would have to be aware of the possibility of attack from there. The good news is that recon could detect a Syrian buildup before it became dangerous. Then diplomacy, outright warnings or perhaps even deterrent air attacks could prevent it. But if need be, a substantial part of that force might have to deploy facing west to keep that flank secure.

I consider direct armed involvement to be unlikely. Far more likely is covert aid in the form of supplies, but that can be dealt with in a number of ways and it is not likely to affect the outcome of the war substantially.

Given a hypothetical two-prong attack, a secondary force comes down from the north protected by Air Force units based in Turkey, while the main attack comes up from the SE protected by carrier aircraft. After Basrah is taken by the Marines, the Army brings in as many of its forces as are considered necessary for the upcoming offensive and a buildup takes place. Perhaps the Marines continue to push forward but that will not be very aggressive because both supplies and numbers are not there for a major offensive. One hope is that the Iraqis will fall for a trap and try to attack at that point; doing so will force them to concentrate their forces on roads coming down from Baghdad where they can be cut to pieces by air assault. But if, as I expect, they do not do this, then after the Army has moved a substantial force in then the main assault will begin from both fronts at once.

The main highway from Basrah to Baghdad is, unfortunately, on the north side of the Tigris river and thus it would be necessary to keep alert for an attack on flank by Iran. A fair amount of the movement might turn out to be done overland on the south side of the Tigris, but there are advantages to moving on a highway if you can get one. Like with Syria, an Iranian buildup could be detected and countered when needed, but a mobile reserve would have to be maintained for that purpose. (IMHO the best force for this would be the 101st air mobile division.)

Taking territory is not the point; the goal is to lure the Iraqi forces into battle and destroy them while not taking politically unacceptable losses on the American side.

Eventually Iraq commits its forces, probably to the south, and then there is a pitched battle.

I think we'd win it, but it would not be as lopsided as it was in 1990. There will be a substantial number of American casualties. The majority of those casualties would be due to minefields and artillery fire and direct infantry engagement. Iraqi armor will be relatively ineffective and will not knock out American tanks in substantial numbers, but some IFVs may be lost to Iraqi tank fire if mistakes are made. (And mistakes are always made.)

Eventually the Iraqi forces are broken and they begin to withdraw, and this is the point of maximum danger. This is where Hussein pulls out his chemical weapons and uses them.

The question is how they would be delivered. They can be delivered with rockets, or by artillery, or through the use of the remnants of his air force, or by burying them with remote control or time delay fuses and setting them off after the American forces move onto them.

Casualties will be heavy, at least initially. The best way to deal with chemical weapons is to not be where they are, and places contaminated with them will have to be avoided. Units there will withdraw, and the attack will channel around them.

Chemical weapons are particularly advantageous from the Iraqi point of view because they make for good TV. They are a horrifying weapon, and those who are not killed by them are maimed. Given that the war will be won or lost in American living rooms, a chemical attack is the best weapon Iraq has.

American response at this point is a serious concern. Doctrine is to respond to the use of chemical weapons with tactical nuclear weapons, and I think there's a good chance that it would happen. There is virtually no chance that we would use them against population centers, but some military formations out in the desert would get nuked. The best chance is that this would be a tit-for-tat response (one for one) but it raises holy hell internationally when it happens. "While we don't condone the Iraqi use of chemical weapons, nonetheless..." You've already seen this logic in the aftermath of the September attack: it's water under the bridge and you cannot use nukes even if your own forces are being slaughtered. If there was any coalition of European forces involved, this ends it. (Which is the biggest reason why the United States probably won't let them be involved.)

Ultimately, however, that decision would be made in American living rooms. And if the WTC attacks enraged Americans, a chemical attack on US servicemen would make that rage white hot. So I think a limited nuclear response is inevitable.

Iraq's other use of chemical weapons is via SCUD attacks on Israel. The Iraqi hope that this will set off a general mid-East war, but the situation is not comparable to 1990.

In 1990 the SCUD attacks on Israel represented a considerable danger to the American coalition because of its substantial Arab component. If Israel had become a co-belligerent, the coalition would have fallen apart. On the other hand, in this hypothetical current war against Iraq, Turkey is already friendly with Israel and Kuwait if it is involved probably doesn't care enough about it one way or the other, and no-one else matters. The coalition will not involve any Arab forces. So while an Iraqi attack on Israel would provoke a savage response by the Israeli air force against Iraq, it would not derail the progress of the war. It is certainly unlikely to inspire Egypt or Syria to attack Israel.

After an American nuclear response, chemical attacks would cease and the war would come down to mopping up. The biggest question would be whether the Iraqis would actively defend within Baghdad (resulting in a huge civilian casualty toll), or whether they would have collapsed before we got there and surrendered.


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