Stardate 20030119.1910

(On Screen): During the Cold War, one of the things that the USSR often tried to do was to get us to make a concession simply in order to get them to consent to diplomatic negotiations, almost as if we had to buy their attention in some way. There were a few cases when it actually worked, but for the most part our leaders got wise to that.

Among the many things that North Korea still retains from its Stalinist model is this tendency to try to get concessions just for the privilege of being talked to. So when various other nations have tried to peddle deals, including the latest Russian one which attempts to rewind the clock to last September, the North Koreans were polite but relatively uninterested. They want to talk to America, to no one else besides America, and they want us to pay for the privilege.

"The nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula was created by the United States and must be wholly resolved with us and the United States sitting knee-to-knee," the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) quoted one North Korean official as saying.

"If this becomes internationalized, a resolution will become more complicated."

North Korea has said it will talk only to the United States, and then only on certain conditions.

So what, pray tell, are the "certain conditions"? Well, three. First, that the US sign a non-agression treaty, second that it formally declare abandonment of its hostile policy towards North Korea, and third that it cease raising its "unreasonable and brigandish" demand that North Korea stop working on nuclear weapons.

Simple, really. Such a small thing. If we do those things, North Korea will then meet us to start negotiating. All we have to do is give them everything they want, ahead of time, and then they'll talk to us. How can we pass up such a deal?

I think that we'll have to take a long time (a very long time) to consider the ramifications of this. Wouldn't want to rush things, you know. Seems to me that it might well take us several months to decide what to do about this.