USS Clueless              Voyages of a restless mind

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Stardate 20011114.0604 (On Screen): Some things in Afghanistan are becoming more clear now. One thing in particular is how and why Pashto tribal leaders have decided to revolt against the Taliban. It's not just that the Taliban are hated (and apparently nearly everyone in Afghanistan despises them now) but I think the more persuasive argument was that in the new government which will be formed, Pashto people will need to bargain from a position of strength if they want to be reasonably well represented in it. If they were to sit idly by while the Northerners did all the fighting, they'd have no moral authority to part of the spoils. But if they in turn participate in the uprising, then they'll be able to claim that they were part of the revolution -- which in fact it turns out that they are.

Another thing which becomes clear is that our special forces (and very likely British ones) have been setting up this uprising for a long time and have done a superb job. Rather than try to create local defections, they made deals with the local warlords so that when a general campaign began they'd be ready to switch sides -- sort of like setting up a whole lot of dominoes. Then once all the dominoes were stood on end, the battle for Mazar-e Sharif set off the chain reaction. While nay-sayers said "They're not doing anything!" our special forces ignored the criticism and went about their business quietly setting up conditions for a victory.

One of the reasons they can do this is that they speak local languages. I've been thinking about this and I suspect that the language they've been using is probably Arabic. While it's not native in Afghanistan, surely there will be many people there who speak it (since it's the language of the Q'uran), and it will certainly be more impressive to the locals when foreign devils come around and don't try to speak English to them. But the number of special forces troops who speak Arabic must be quite limited; and that's another reason why the SAS probably are in this up to their ears, because in this campaign such men will be gold and I'm sure the SAS has some as well. Of course, special forces people are even more of a "silent service" than are submariners, so it may be years before we hear any of the true story of what went into setting up this victory, if we ever do.

The Taliban have decided that there is more security to be found in caves than in urban areas. This is decidedly a mixed blessing -- but then, a successful wartime campaign will present its enemy only with bad choices. It also seems to represent a triumph of tradition over clear thinking by the Taliban, since traditionally caves have been a safe haven. Of course, traditionally their enemies didn't have
GBU-28 "bunker busters". The Taliban are trading a human shield for one made of stone, and they are about to discover that this was a poor trade. On the other hand, the human shield itself was turning on them and represented a danger in its own right.

Finally, a key factor in the disintegration of the Taliban's army appears to have been not defections but outright desertion. Large parts of their army was made up of men who had been forcibly impressed, and such men only fight when they have no alternative. Once the opportunity arose, they just plain left and went home. they didn't change sides to be on the side of the victorious army, they decided they didn't want to be part of anyone's army. Between casualties, defections and wholesale desertion, it appears that most of the Taliban's army is now gone, and with nearly the entire country apparently in revolution against them, it becomes easier to understand why what remains of Taliban forces are in wholesale retreat. (discuss)