Stardate 20030712.2332

(Captain's log): Tom Lehrer wrote a classic song in the 1960's about nuclear proliferation:

First we got the bomb and that was good,
'Cause we love peace and motherhood.
Then Russia got the bomb, but that's O.K.,
'Cause the balance of power's maintained that way!
Who's next?

France got the bomb, but don't you grieve,
'Cause they're on our side (I believe).
China got the bomb, but have no fears;
They can't wipe us out for at least five years!
Who's next?

Then Indonesia claimed that they
Were gonna get one any day.
South Africa wants two, that's right:
One for the black and one for the white!
Who's next?

Egypt's gonna get one, too,
Just to use on you know who.
So Israel's getting tense,
Wants one in self defense.
"The Lord's our shepherd," says the psalm,
But just in case, we better get a bomb!
Who's next?

Luxembourg is next to go
And, who knows, maybe Monaco.
We'll try to stay serene and calm
When Alabama gets the bomb!
Who's next, who's next, who's next?
Who's next?

After any war, there are always lessons learned. Everyone who was involved and survived it will learn lessons, and everyone on the outside who watched will learn lessons, or should.

In 1991, the biggest lesson of the Gulf War was: "Don't ever give the US 6 months to build up forces on your border." Fortunately for us, Saddam himself didn't seem to learn that lesson, and he put his faith in "international law" and the power of the UN to bind the hands of the US. And fortunately for us, Bush didn't care about the UN. So months of diplomatic haggling covered the buildup, and Saddam did not look for a military solution.

The danger was that he'd attack our forces in the early stages of deployment, by moving a large force to the Kuwait border and across it before there was a large US force in place, or would launch a rocket bombardment (especially using chemical weapons). But that didn't happen.

The battles in Afghanistan and in Iraq have taught the world a couple of big lessons. First: Soviet weapons are completely useless against Americans. Second: The Americans don't actually have to fight a big muscley war; they can fight lots of ways, and will. Third, really don't give the Americans six months to build a force on your border.

Fourth and last: if the Americans paint a bull's eye on you, there are only two ways to survive: knuckle under, or have nuclear weapons.

And don't get caught trying to develop them until after you have working ones.

Which is why the two remaining members of the Axis of Evil are desperately trying to create nukes. And why, fairly soon, Bush is going to earn his pay by being forced to make a truly difficult decision, and maybe two.

The tricky part in creating nukes is coming up with enough U-235 or plutonium. Once you've got that, everything else is pretty straightforward. But creating and purifying fissionables requires a big and complex plant and a lot of power and time, no matter what kind of fissionable you're creating. The processes involved in creating weapons-grade U-235 are radically different than in creating plutonium, but both are large, slow, involve lots of specialized equipment and are difficult to hide.

Reuters reports that a South Korean who used to be in SK Intelligence has reported that North Korean diplomats in New York have informed the US that they've completed reprocessing 8000 fuel rods, which if true would mean they now have enough plutonium to create several fission weapons.

Of course, maybe this is a crock. Maybe the SK ex-Intelligence guy is full of it. Maybe NK is engaged in yet more brinkmanship. Maybe they're lying or bluffing. Maybe it's another translation problem.

But there's no question that they are reprocessing fuel rods, and soon Bush will have to make a decision about stopping it, and pretty much the only way to do so conclusively is to bomb the facility where it's happening. (Making a deal is no longer a viable choice; Clinton and Carter tried that and NK cheated.)

Iran, too, is trying to produce fissionables. They claim they're only trying to enrich uranium to be used in power plants, but no one believes that, and as David Warren points out, soon Bush will have to make a decision to destroy their facility as well.

Actually obliterating those facilities wouldn't be too hard. It could easily be done with cruise missiles, or maybe the B-2 might actually have a mission worthy of it. (But quite frankly, cruise missiles are a better choice.)

Of course, what with the gibbering fury of the North Korean government, if we actually bomb NK territory, anything could happen afterwards. Such an attack could set off a new Korean war, and that's something no one wants to see happen. And bombing Iran could have all kinds of interesting consequences too, not least of which is that it could abort any nascent revolution there. (The fact that Iran is the primary supporter of Hizbollah adds spice to the mix.)

So they're both going to be really tough calls, but at the rate things are going, it looks like we'll have to face one or the other of those decisions soon, probably by the end of September.

I'm surely glad I don't have to make those decisions. And I'm equally glad that Al Gore doesn't have to, either. But as Warren points out, that decision will be based very strongly on intelligence information about just how advanced their programs are. And that's another reason why it's going to be a tough decision.

In a sense, it's going to be a decision similar to the one to invade Iraq. There will be an estimate of a range of possible consequences if we attack, and a range of possible consequences if we do not. All of them will be what we engineers refer to as SWAGs (Scientific Wild-Ass Guesses). Like it or not, it isn't possible for our intelligence agencies to know everything that's happening in the world, and though they'll have a lot to work with, there is going to be a lot of estimation involved. And that's on both sides of the equation; estimation of how advanced both programs are, and estimation of the kind of retaliation which might take place if we attack.

Will we be better off if we do launch, or do not? Is there a chance that their programs are fictional or run by incompetents? Is it possible that they don't really know what they're doing and that their bombs may not function once built? Is it possible that their researchers are lying to their own governments about how far along they are?

Well, yes, it is possible. But it's also possible that they truly are quite advanced. It's possible that they actually are within months of producing adequate quantities of fissionables.

Would NK launch its conventional suicide attack southward if we bomb? There's no way of knowing. Would Iran unleash Hizbollah, order them to start launching attacks against the US? Would Iran start giving Hizbollah more support, including "interesting" weapons with which to make their attack? Given how easy it is to produce poison gas, might Iran manage to create (or already have) a few tons of it and sort of slip it under the table to Hizbollah, for attacks against Israel and Europe and the US? It's not like they haven't already been smuggling weapons to Hizbollah, after all. What might be in the next fishing boat bound for Lebanon?

Which alternative is worse? Which act costs us more? What are the risks? The decision will be a calculated gamble, and whichever course we choose, the alternative becomes academic thereafter (except for the backbiting and second-guessing by opponents), and the only political reality will be the course we've chosen, and whatever consequences follow from that choice.

And another big question: Is Bush a statesman or a politician? If Bush launches an attack on NK, and sets off a new Korean war with huge and deadly consequences, his chance of winning reelection is low. It still might be the right thing to do, but it would require him to sacrifice his own career. Will he be willing to make that decision? I don't know, but I hope so.

But I hope even more that it won't come to that. There are branches and possibilities in both cases which might save us from facing that grim decision. The situation in Korea can be solved short of war if and only if the Chinese finally decide it needs to be solved, and realize that they can't expect us to buy NK off again. The situation in Iran can be solved if the revolution happens in time. And both of those add even more complication to the decision. Is it better to face a bomb/don't-bomb decision now, or wait another month and hope the problem will get solved other ways? Can we threaten the Chinese with the possibility of us bombing, in hopes that they'll finally face reality and work to defuse the situation first? If we wait another month, is there a chance that the revolution in Iran may actually happen? If we wait another month and then bomb, will the risks be greater?

When do you decide that the risk of waiting just a bit longer isn't justified? The meta-decision about when you have to make the decision is at least as hard as the bomb/don't-bomb decision itself will be. I'm sure a lot of people in the military and intelligence agencies in the US the UK are spending a lot of time thinking about this.