Stardate 20030411.1334

(Captain's log): There are a lot of government and military leaders around the world right now who are feeling distinctly nervous. This is a good thing. The conduct of this war has punctured some pleasing myths about the US.

The first Gulf War was at the time considered one of the most lopsided victories in history, though in retrospect it's now considered to have been a potential victory which was given away by a deeply misguided decision at the last moment by President Bush. And the shadow of Viet Nam, and previous experience in Beirut, and later experiences in Mogadishu and elsewhere, reinforced certain ideas about the US which have now proved untrue.

Going into Afghanistan, again and again we heard warnings that "Afghanistan is no Iraq." Afghanistan was traditionally the grave of western armies; the terrain was terrible, the warriors fierce, the weather awful, and the British and Russians had both met their match there. Why did the Americans think they could do any better? It would be a quagmire, that all-purpose word we've heard so much lately. We'd go in and get bloodied; once the body bags started coming home, the American people would lose heart and we'd be the latest in a long line of westernized armies handed their ass by the fierce Afghan warriors, a place where warfare has been the national sport for hundreds of years. (When they didn't have outsiders to fight, they fought each other.)

But CENTCOM designed a very unorthodox campaign. Eschewing the use of large-scale American military formations, the US instead fought the war on the ground with a surprisingly small contingent of special forces operatives. They used two weapons in particular to great advantage: high-tech communications and targeting equipment allowing them to directly control placement of precision guided munitions, and briefcases full of hundred dollar bills. Initially we allied with the Northern Alliance, a ragtag group made up of the losers of Afghanistan's civil war. But other SF operatives worked all over Afghanistan, contacting tribal leaders and making deals. This was very much in tune with how the Afghans themselves fought wars. Changing sides was a way of life there.

And that's the point: we didn't try to take our kind of war to Afghanistan; we fought and won their kind of war, only we fought it using our weapons. We fought the Afghan way, only we were better at it than the Taliban. Afghans like being on the winning side, and when our favored side in the war had the advantage of direct air support from the US Navy and the US Air Force, that gave them a distinct advantage. As things began to go badly for the Taliban, it became easier to convince other leaders that the Taliban were losers and that it was time to change sides, especially if you like money.

Not every weapon we have was useful there. For instance, there wasn't a lot of need for attack subs to fight against a land-locked nation (though they did launch some of the Tomahawks used in that war). But we have such a wide variety of military capabilities that we had many which were very useful, and they gave us a massive edge.

But the real edge was our men. Wars are fought by men, not by weapons. And the men who served us in Afghanistan were superbly trained, highly motivated, and were the key to victory. It was the men on the ground who won the war for us, and it was they who paid the price for doing so. It is a blessing that the price for us was so low, but it is also a testament to their skill and dedication.

As a result, we were able to win a war there in weeks. And we did so in a way which totally confounded outside observers; it didn't look in the slightest like the way that they expected Americans to fight. Worse, we made it look easy. The only thing that did not surprise them, actually did surprise them too: our use of precision guided munitions. Everyone expected that, but no one truly expected them to perform as well as they did, or to be used in the way that they were. A combination of PGMs and truly devastating area-effect weapons (cluster bombs and FAEs) was surprising not because it was used but because it was so effective.

OK, well then, the Americans were actually able to fight and win in Afghanistan after all. But winning one kind of war doesn't tell you how they'll do in an entirely different kind of war.

In the run-up to Iraq, we began to hear the strange warning: "Iraq is not Afghanistan". We were told that the tactics which were used in Afghanistan, which resulted in a rapid victory with almost no American casualties, would not work in Iraq. This time we were going to be facing a real army, and we'd have to actually slug it out with them.

In 1991, a pattern developed for "how Americans fight conventional wars as aggressors" and was expected by nearly everyone to be followed this time, too. (Including by me.) The war would start with a period of air bombardments to weaken the enemy, after which we'd move forward and crush the enemy. And implicit in that was what was assumed by many to be a deep weakness: if there was any kind of perception at home that things were not going well, or that American casualties were too high, then support for the war would evaporate and American would retreat quickly. The presumption was that the weapons were flashy, the uniforms natty, the berets looked good, but that there was no resolve, no willingness to see things through. Many thought that deep down America was cowardly, corrupt, decadent, gutless. American military power was a paper tiger; impressive as all hell to look at but not actually willing to fight if there would be any significant cost in blood.

It is a blessing that we still have not been tested by the challenge of massive casualties, but in every other way the war in Iraq again confounded expectations. It was fought using a much smaller force than expected and in fact was outnumbered by the paper strength of Iraq's ground forces by about 3:1. CENTCOM had the equivalent of about 5 divisions of ground forces, about one and a half of which were British.

As we now know, the war was fought brilliantly. Press coverage and "expert" commentary in the US and elsewhere tried to portray it as bogging down, and tried to claim that major mistakes had been made and that it was all going to go deeply badly once we reached Baghdad and had to engage in city fighting, where our weapons would mostly be useless. But it's difficult now to claim that given the stunning events of the last five days (though some are still trying).

It was not just that it was rapid, efficient, and amazingly devoid of setbacks that surprised. It was also that it wasn't fought "the American way". There was no period of massive air bombardment before ground forces moved, for instance. There was no attempt to capture each individual city along the way before moving on. A major psyops campaign didn't actually result in huge numbers of surrenders, but a combination of psyops and special forces operations to make contact with select Iraqi military commanders (and perhaps to talk to them using yet more stacks of hundred dollar bills) resulted in the majority of the regular Iraqi army sitting out the war, and mass desertions among most of the units which tried to fight. There was a lot else going on: a lot of the ground that the strikes to Baghdad moved over had previously been scouted by SF teams, and they were out in Iraq doing things like protecting dams and oil fields, and attacking communications facilities, and a lot of other critical things about which we can only speculate.

The northern deficit caused by the diplomatic failure to gain permission from Turkey to permit three additional divisions to operate from there was an unpleasant surprise, but CENTCOM came up with an alternative and did an 'Afghanistan' in the area, allying with the Kurds. Where the southern advance relied heavily on tanks and IFVs, the northern combat force was much lighter but no less successful, paying no higher a price in blood for victory. In a sense we fought two entirely different wars in Iraq, using entirely different kinds of forces and entirely different tactics. And we won them both conclusively.

And the final surprise was the rapid fall of Baghdad, not through classic street and house fighting, but through the use of armored formations. Instead of weeks of slow advances with a huge civilian death toll, Baghdad was taken in days by a few massive strokes.

One of the key decisions in the plan was to give the British responsibility for Basra and the area of Iraq SE of there. Some American Marines were assigned to that operation early on and worked with the British but in relatively short order the Marines headed out on their main assignment as the second thrust towards Baghdad. The British then executed a classic operation to clear Basra of militants, taking advantage of the time they had as the American forces were advancing. There was no need for an early victory in Basra, and the British used the time well.

There were several reasons why it was a good decision. For one thing, it was simply good public relations. The British had been our primary partners diplomatically in this entire campaign, and this gave the British government and the British people a major victory which was entirely theirs to feel deservedly proud about afterwards. They took advantage of American precision bombing when they needed it, but it was a British operation under British command fought by British ground forces, and thus a British victory. There will be no bitterness that the Brits were just serving as American cannon fodder.

But it was also important operationally because the British, as good as they are, are not equipped and trained to operate on a modern American battlefield. They don't have the communications equipment or the doctrine or the low level training to fight the way we do, and this decision meant that the main strikes on Baghdad were made by purely American force structures.

What we find in the main phase of the war is a combination of planning and improvisation. Reports are that the only surprises our forces got were pleasant ones, and our forces did not fail to take advantage of opportunities when they arose. In particular, they were superb at taking advantage of what seemed to be Iraqi command paralysis at all levels. Which is why it was that our forces actually reached the outskirts of Baghdad ahead of schedule. (That's ironic considering all the criticism about how it was going too slowly.) And then, with what reports now say was a major decision by the commander of 3rd ID, they tore up the book on city fighting and sent major columns in.

Against a well-ordered defending force, properly prepared, in good morale, using a reasonable defense plan, that would have been a disaster. But it was discovered that we didn't face that, and they made a decision on the spot to try something new. We all know now how that came out.

What emerges from this is an image of a military force which is large, powerful, well equipped, and above all versatile.

What emerges is a volunteer military force which is superbly trained and highly motivated and trusted at all levels to use their initiative.

What emerges is that there no longer is an "American way of war". The American way of war is to adapt to the local situation and to drastically adjust everything, from force structure to tactics, to fit that situation. The American way of war is to use what works and not use what doesn't, and to throw away the book if need be.

What emerges is an appreciation that American wizard weapons are even better than anyone expected.

What emerges is that our current leadership and our people unwaveringly supported the war. Despite all efforts to the contrary by native activists and many in the press and foreign powers, support for the war among the American people has been strong all along. Polls have consistently shown support over the last few months, wavering only really as a function of how slanted the poll's questions were. And President Bush has demonstrated the kind of unwavering dedication that few thought any American leader would ever muster. And even when there was a massive attempt by vocal opponents and many in the press to try to depict the war as a failure in hopes of reducing support for it, there was no wavering of support overall. When casualties started to mount, support didn't waver.

What emerges is an image of a military force which is powerful, highly competent, versatile, not wedded to convention, and not crippled by doubt.

And what emerges is a nation which is loyal and true to its friends, but both willing and able to totally obliterate its enemies. Saddam was crushed in three weeks, and we didn't even use the majority of our military capability when we crushed him.

What emerges is that America is a friend to value, but an enemy to fear.

Thus it is that leaders around the world are now feeling shock, and awe, and fear. And this is good. And because of this, a lot of things elsewhere will start to go our way. We will see much less contempt in future. And thus in negotiations they'll be more forthcoming with concessions so as to avoid the fate which befell Saddam.

Because we won in a manner so unconventional and so convincing, we are unlikely to have to fight again, soon. Unless we fuck up royally.

It is now important that we continue to act strongly. We must not repeat the blunder made in 1991 of giving away politically the fruits of victory won on the battlefield. The danger we now face is being seen as strong and dangerous, but also stupid and gullible. If we win the war but give away the results to our enemies, then it will all have been for nothing. That was one of the long term results of the first Gulf War. When Iraq was defeated, and then Saddam was permitted to keep some of his military force and to remain in power, many came to believe that the US was too stupid to actually win a war even when its enemy was down and out.

The goal of this war – the overall war, not just the battle of Iraq which is part of it – is to destabilize the entire region. That is the desirable outcome.

Destabilization is being portrayed by many as being an unintended side effect, a negative result which we are urged to work to limit. Those saying this are either naive or disingenuous, because it's the primary reason for fighting in Iraq and always was. The goal is to bring about reform in a large number of nations in that region which have been mired in incompetent and brutal autocratic rule for decades. Conquering Iraq, and giving Iraq a liberalized government and a successful mercantile society will help bring that about.

This is truly a war of liberation. We are fighting, out of narrow self interest, to liberate the Arab people from the chains of tribalism and religious extremism and authoritarianism which bind them. We intend to liberate, and liberalize, the entire region over a generation, because if we do not they will keep attacking us and trying to kill us.

But the international powers who opposed the war in the first place also oppose this reform. They now call for letting the UN control the reconstruction process, and that cannot be accepted. A new Iraq created under UN auspices would not become what we need it to be in order to help win the war. The nations who have influence in the UN would use that to make sure it did not, because they do not want the region liberated. Their goals for the region are diametrically opposite our own, and they will foil our plans to the extent that we permit them to do so.

But they can do nothing if we don't permit it; they have no real power besides dishonesty and diplomatic subterfuge and a facility for hypocrisy. As long as we recognize that they intend to cheat us, we will be safe.

In the mean time, we have won a great victory in Iraq, and an even greater one in the world. The next time we say to someone, "Don't make us come over there", they won't. America's already-great diplomatic power has now been massively enhanced, through a clear demonstration that any explicit or implicit threats of military operations we might make are not empty. Paradoxically, that will significantly reduce the likelihood of us having to fight again.