Stardate 20020222.1050

(On Screen): Charles Johnson points to this five-part series in National Review about the strategic considerations regarding the war in Iraq; it is excellent and fits nicely with my own analysis of the more prosaic tactical considerations in the war. Robbins' article: Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4, Part 5.

I'm not sure I give as much credence to the Iraqi opposition as Robbins does. I don't think we can rely on them. For one thing, I think we have to assume that the INC is riddled with spies. For another, when it really comes down to it we may discover that they really are no more than silk suits in London and are not really willing to take risks.

Much of what he says about the use of psyops to weaken the will to resist by the Iraqi forces is completely credible. A rational plan for ground action won't assume that it will happen that way, however. As the old aphorism goes, hope for the best but prepare for the worst. The ground operation has to be designed under the assumption that the Iraqi army will fight to the last. Then, if it turns out that they surrender in numbers, it is a pleasant surprise that you take advantage of, rather than resistance being an unpleasant surprise that you can't deal with.

He doesn't deal with the political issues involved in siege, and the concern that it will devolve into attrition war. City fighting is the big problem that remains to be solved, for it will surely come down to that. My idea for use of non-lethal area denial weapons may well come into play. It would certainly be a good way to deal with suspected military targets hidden inside what are ostensibly civilian structures. If you think that a school is really a military command post, then hit it with stink bombs at 2AM local time. If you're wrong, no-one is hurt; if you're right, the military inside would have to clear out, and they'd have to leave most of their equipment and files behind which would destroy the effectiveness of the organization just as surely as if they were all dead.