Stardate 20020126.1059

(On Screen): Arafat's response to the pressure he is under is typically feeble. He is begging Palestinian militant groups to lay off attacks on Israel, for the moment, pretty please with sugar on top. BFD.

Diplomacy and military strategy sometimes require asking unaskable questions, so here's one: Would we be better off with Arafat dead?

I think we would be. But let's do it by the numbers.

Arafat represents a unified Palestinian cause. He negotiates on behalf of the Palestinian people. The problem with that is that it is an illusion: the Palestinians are not actually united. There are at least six Palestinian groups who have their own foreign policy (which amounts to "Israel must die") and which operate autonomously.

The big question all along was whether Arafat actually had the ability to control them but refused to use it, or actually had no control at all and merely pretended he did. The rising degree of pressure being applied to Arafat recently amounts to an experiment to see which it was, and it seems as if he actually does not have control. With his physical situation in peril, with his political situation in tatters, with support from Arab nations soft and declining, and with unprecedented hostility from the US, the only thing he needed to do in order to right the situation was to deliver two straight weeks without any attacks on Israel — and he hasn't done it. His best shot has been to beg for support from the Palestinian militants.

Which means that there is no point in negotiating with him. Even if he made an agreement, it's no longer plausible that he could deliver what he said. He doesn't actually represent the Palestinian people; he doesn't have the ability to negotiate on their behalf. If Israel actually made a deal with him, the Palestinians would cheat on it. The one essential concession that the Palestinians would have to make on any deal is a complete cessation of attacks on Israel. It is clear that Arafat does not have the ability to enforce that.

Arafat has no obvious successor. Like many petty tyrants he's done that deliberately, primarily as a defense against coups and assassination. But that also means that when Arafat dies (and all men die eventually) then the Palestinian cause will splinter. Or rather, its deep divisions will become apparent to all; the fiction of Palestinian unity will become untenable.

As long as Arafat remains alive, it will be necessary to deal with the diplomatic fiction of Palestinian unity. With his death, all would acknowledge the reality of Palestinian anarchy. In particular, it would force the Arab nations, and the Palestinians themselves, to acknowledge that the Palestinians are not unified.

Why would that be better? The failure of negotiation with the Palestinians until now has been due to the fact that they actually are not capable of negotiating. All negotiations are predicated upon the assumption of good faith: each side makes promises, and both sides then deliver on those promises. The reality is that Arafat cannot do that. Even if he makes an agreement, he can't deliver.

Once it is realistically acknowledged by everyone involved that the Palestinians are not unified and cannot negotiate, then it will become possible to adopt rational policies which might conceivably move the situation to one where the Palestinians actually become unified and would actually be able to make and stick to a deal. Unfortunately, this pretty much mandates a Palestinian civil war, because it is unlikely to be possible to unify the Palestinians any other way. But it would force the Arab nations who claim to support the Palestinians to apply their diplomatic influence towards the goal of healing the divisions within the Palestinians (where it might do some good) instead of at the futile attempt to wish Israel out of existence. And it would force the Palestinians themselves to recognize their disunity.

It is always better to deal with an ugly reality than a pleasant illusion. The illusion of Palestinian unity is the largest barrier to peace in the region.

So I conclude that the death of Arafat would, in the long run, help the situation. Should we kill him? (By 'we" I mean Israel, with advice and consent from the US. It is political reality that Israel cannot do that without American consent.)

It would be best if he dies naturally, of course, but he's 72 and it might be more than ten years before he kicks the bucket. But that's one alternative: the US cuts off all contact with Arafat; Israel occupies the West Bank and Gaza, and we wait for him to die. The result would be a rising level of violence.

Second best would be a deniable assassination, but that is unlikely to succeed. His security against that is too good; he's been at risk of assassination for years (decades) and has long since taken precautions.

Direct military action to kill him would be the worst alternative, but if it is decided to take him out now, it is the only way which could succeed.

If that happened, the West Bank and Gaza would go up in flames. Israel would have to seal its borders. And every "settlement" would become a target for Palestinian attacks. Israel does not have the ability to increase its military presence in the occupied territories to the extent that would needed to quell this, so the only alternative would be to evacuate all the occupants of the settlements, which would then probably all be destroyed by the Palestinians.

Which, ironically, would be a good thing. The settlements are one of the big stumbling blocks preventing peace. It's been clear for a long time that they had to be removed, but that wasn't politically possible in Israel. But if there was wholesale war and if the settlers were under full-scale military assault by Palestinian mobs, then it would become politically feasible to pull them out "temporarily", and then to make that permanent in the long run. For example, if the anti-Israeli unrest then converted into violent anarchy and then into a Palestinian civil war, it would be clear that it would be too dangerous for the settlers to return. Any temporary condition that lasts three years becomes permanent.

There would be diplomatic damage to Israel, or so it would seem at first glance. But it's hard to see how Israel's diplomatic situation could get any worse than it already is. Jordan will not become militant against Israel because it isn't capable of doing so. Egypt will not because it cannot afford to lose the yearly economic subsidy it receives from the US. Lebanon will not because Lebanon has no government. (It has something it calls a government, but it only bears a passing resemblance to a real one.) Syria is already mobilized; there would be no change there.

Israel is already isolated diplomatically in the world. The Europeans would cluck, and wring their hands, and frown real hard in Israel's general direction, but would not do anything substantive. The single most important relationship Israel has is with the US, and that would not change.

Internationally there would be uproar which would then die down. In the long run it would damage Israel about as much as its invasion of Lebanon. The diplomatic cost would be high, but not unsupportable.

So perhaps it actually is time for Arafat to give his life for his country.