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The designation "Mountain" comes from the fact that they are trained and equipped to operate in rough terrain. Although mechanized (as are all US infantry divisions now) they don't require it to the same extent that other infantry divisions do, and units of the 10th are capable of operating in mountains without mechanized support. All troops are trained to move on skis (skis to the 10th are like parachutes to the 82nd) and are also trained to climb with ropes and pitons; the 10th can move rapidly over terrain which would defeat any other unit except Airborne, and when they arrive they will be much more heavily armed than Airborne would be (because Airborne are light troops; the 10th emphatically is not). It should be noted that "division" is an organizational term, not a statement of size. In history, "divisions" have varied all the way from 2,000 men to as many as 35,000 at various times. US divisions tend to be very heavy (almost all the largest divisions in history were American). A "division" is generally the smallest organization in an army which is capable of operating on its own and which contains organically nearly everything it needs to fight. The next step down is the Brigade. US infantry brigades don't have organic scout or engineer units, and inadequate artillery, communications and medical. Most of those assets are held at the divisional level. The 10th Mountain Division has six infantry battalions, two artillery battalions, four attached air units (attack and transport helicopters), four support battalions (logistics), plus attached battalions to take care of administration, intelligence, signals and communication, engineering (sappers), medical, and air defense, There's also a battalion of Military Police, whose job is to protect all the non-combat elements and also to protect supply dumps and communications (i.e. roads in the rear) and to take care of prisoners and to keep the peace among civilians in captured areas. Military "engineers" are not the same as what I do as an engineer. They're responsible for replacing bridges, laying and clearing mine fields, using "special weapons", and taking care of demolition. Against an entrenched foe, it's not uncommon for engineers to lead the attack to clear fixed obstacles and clear intervening mines and let other units through. (To rapidly clear paths through a minefield at the front, they have special vehicles which can fire what looks like a rope to lay across it. It's actually plastic explosive, and when it goes off it detonates any mines near by, leaving a cleared road.) The 10th is not a unit you'd like to have standing on your border looking angry. The Taliban have nothing capable of opposing it. Now inevitably people will ask "If the USSR couldn't do it, why do you think that the US can?" Because the goals of the operations would be different. The USSR did successfull invade Afghanistan; the problem was that they tried to hold it, and that's where they failed. That would not be the goal of a hypothetical US operation. This would be "search and destroy": move in, find bin Ladin and his organization and annihilate them, and then leave again. We don't want Afghanistan -- we just want bin Ladin. If we are willing to accept some losses (and we are, I believe, at this point; no-one is expecting a bloodless war anymore) then this is something we are capable of doing. If I were the Taliban, I'd be afraid now, too. (discuss) |