Stardate 20020801.1142

(On Screen): An MSNBC analysis begins as follows:

The drumbeat is growing louder in Washington for a war to oust Saddam Hussein in Iraq, but it hasn't drowned out the grumbling of allies around the world, including King Abdullah II of Jordan, who met President Bush on Thursday at the White House. The king’s reluctance to back a policy of “regime change” in Baghdad reflects the overwhelming opinion of U.S. allies around the world. The implications for the United States are clear: If and when the Bush administration moves against Iraq, it will be moving virtually alone.

This isn't news. I think it was obvious from the beginning that any war in Iraq this time would not be fought by the kind of international military coalition which fought in 1991. I have certainly assumed that with the possible exception of a significant contribution by the UK that the entire operation would be fought by US forces.

But an alliance was used in 1991 not because it was militarily necessary, but because it was politically expedient. The actual fact is that for all of the participation of allied forces, Schwarzkopf designed his battle so that he could win even if everyone except the British failed in their missions.

I wrote about this on October 1 last year, shortly before our bombing campaign in Afghanistan began. The threat of non-support and of America-going-it-alone also hung in the air late last September, when our friends tried to get us to exercise restraint against the Taliban and hoped to get us to consider diplomatic solutions instead of military ones.

And as it turned out, the US was quite capable of fighting the war in Afghanistan without help from anyone except the British. I'm pretty sure we could have done it even without British support, but their air-refueling tankers certainly made the bombardment easier. (That was one of their major contributions, and like all logistics it was important but unglamorous and got little press.)

The governments of France and Germany have announced that they would not support a war in Iraq without prior UN authorization, which is one of many different ways of encoding the same basic demand for European veto over any use of American military power. (Other rhetorical encodings for the same demand are "prior consultation", "multilateralism", and any phrase including the term "alliance".)

"An attack would only be justified if a mandate was approved by the U.N. Security Council. That is the position of Germany and France," Chirac told a joint news conference after a Franco-German summit in the eastern city of Schwerin.

Schroeder said German troops could only participate in such an action with a U.N. mandate and if the German parliament agreed. "There would be no majority for intervention without a U.N. mandate," he told the news conference.

I find myself needing to use the word "pompous" for the second time today. I wish I hadn't wasted it on the Berkeley City Council, because Chirac deserves it more. The Europeans continue to harbor the illusion that their assistance is critical and that their threat to withhold it is actually important.

In the Gulf War, German military contributions were negligible (primarily for legal reasons) and the French contribution was dispensable. The French contributed an armored brigade, and it was given the assignment of moving across the desert to the main highway from Baghdad and setting up across it, to be ready to fight against any reinforcements which might move down to try to strike the main allied attack in the rear. With their flank thus secure, the American and British armor and mech-infantry could execute the now-legendary "left hook" into the Republican Guard without fear of being surprised.

The assignment given to the French was very important, because the threat of an attack from the NW was quite real. However, it has to be remembered that by that point the allies had total air supremacy and patrolled the skies over all of Iraq constantly, and had JSTARS in the theater. Any beginning of such a movement would have been spotted instantly and subjected to withering air assault. (Think "Highway of Death".) But if that didn't stop them, Schwarzkopf had also deployed the American 82nd and 101st divisions on the same mission as was given to the French, and if the French had not held, the Airborne surely would have. (Later in the battle, when it became clear that there would be no attack from the NW, the 82nd was redeployed into combat to its right.)

If anything, the French have even less to contribute now, and we need it even less. The Iraqi military is much less powerful than it was in 1991, when it was at the peak of its capability and training. It lost huge amounts of equipment in 1991 and despite its best efforts it has not replace most of it. Its training and morale have suffered greatly due to purges and other causes. It is not as formidable as it once was. And we didn't really need the French the last time.

Victor Davis Hanson recently took a trip to Europe and found himself on the receiving end of incessant preaching.

A fourth paradox is the changed American attitude toward Europe after September 11. Before that milestone, Europeans were at least smug that their