Stardate 20040103.1051

(On Screen): Writing for ABC News, Fawaz A. Gerges analyzes the consequences of Saddam's capture, and concludes that we're doomed:

But it's critical to keep his capture in perspective, given the deteriorating security situation and the expansion of the armed resistance and the difficulties involved in the complex process of sociopolitical and economic reconstruction.

There is a consensus among U.S. military commanders in Iraq and observers that Hussein did not have operational control over the armed resistance, mainly because he was preoccupied with his survival. It thus remains to be seen if the insurgency will intensify or expire as a result of Hussein's arrest. The initial evidence is not reassuring.

Independent analysts also note the armed resistance encompasses a wider spectrum of political and ideological forces, not only Hussein's diehard supporters, such as indigenous Iraqi Islamists, nationalists, ordinary citizens who have become dissatisfied with the U.S. military occupation and a few hundred Arab fighters who have entered Iraq and joined the insurgency.

The likelihood exists that the resistance could intensify in a way similar to what occurred after the killing of Hussein's sons in July. Far from being a turning point for the better, their deaths plunged Iraq deeper into the throes of violent upheaval and turmoil.

(Emphasis mine) Everything I've read says that the armed resistance is petering out. The rate of attacks has been declining for some time, and the "security situation" is, if anything, improving over the long run.

It's true that Saddam wasn't directly controlling the insurgency, but he was being notified of its activities and a hell of a lot of key information about the structure and operations of the insurgency was found when he was captured. This led to a huge series of raids and arrests, each of which would provide us with further prisoners to interrogate and more documents and leads.

Gerges states that there could be an increase in activities of the resistance as a response to this, just as there was after we killed Qusay and Uday, and it's entirely possible that could happen. But it's looking increasingly unlikely now, because if the insurgency was going to react that way, they would have begun already. Gerges is basing his analysis entirely on the psychology of the resistance without regard to their increasingly bad "security situation", not to mention entirely ignoring the insurgency's growing logistics problem as their assets become exhausted.

Gerges says the sky is falling. I bet you can guess what he thinks the solution should be.

Yup, you got it on the first try: legitimization through internationalization. We need to turn everything over to the UN. (What an original concept, eh?)

The critical variable that will ultimately tip the balance in one direction or another depends on the willingness of the United States to legitimize the process of social and political reconstruction in Iraq. How can the United States convince Iraqis that it does not plan to stay for too long, that it is genuine about their political empowerment, that it does not intend to exploit their resources and that it does not wish to create a puppet government in Baghdad?

Legitimizing the process of political reconstruction requires the Bush administration to show vision, courage and implement concrete policies.

First, all Iraqi communities, including the Sunnis who feel marginalized as a result of the collapse of the Sunni-dominated Baathist regime, must have a stake in the new order being constructed in Iraq.

Second, there's an urgent need to fully internationalize the Iraqi reconstruction project and involve the United Nations and the world community in reassuring Iraqis and giving them time and space to debate, argue and struggle over the future of their country.

Internationalizing the process of political and social reconstruction will not just lend it credibility but it will also convince Iraqis that the United States does not have any designs on their country. Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the most influential Shiite cleric in Iraq, has demanded that the United Nations supervise the process by which a new government is established and certify the result as well.

I wonder if Gerges is aware of the Iraqi opinion of the UN? A couple of weeks ago a delegation from Iraq went to the UN and made a speech castigating it for its utter failure and betrayal of the Iraqi people. Why does Gerges think that the people of Iraq would be somehow reassured if everything was turned over to them?

As to us convincing the Iraqis that we do not plan "to stay for too long", that's exactly the message they most don't want to hear. Obviously they don't want to become an American colony, and we don't intend to make Iraq such a colony. But it's vital that we remain involved there for the long run, and vital that they believe we will be. Polls of Iraqis have consistently shown that one of their greatest fears is exactly that we'd pull out early and leave them on their own.

As to "legitimacy", we're ear