Stardate 20030404.1450

(Captain's log): One of the more noteworthy lack-of-occurrences so far in this war has been a lack of initial celebration by Iraqi civilians as our troops moved through. In the early days, some who oppose the war seized on this as evidence that the Iraqi people actually didn't want us there, but that's not why it's really happened.

The people there, especially in southern Iraq, were badly burned by us. There had been strong rhetoric by the US government encouraging a revolt, and the Shiites took us at our word, and did rise in revolution. And Saddam's government cracked down, while we stood by and watched, and did nothing. I was ashamed of that then and I still am.

The majority of the Iraqi people want Saddam gone, and they've never had any doubt we could take him out if we wanted to. What they are worried about is whether we'll finish the job. As long as there is any chance of the Baathists remaining in power even in the short term, then any kind of public demonstration of support for the invading army is suicide.

Literally; there are reports of one woman who waved at our troops as they went past, and after they were gone, fedayeen took her away and hung her.

The soldiers in the Iraqi military also harbor doubt about us. They've always known that if we wanted to we could conquer Iraq. But they can't be certain if we'll give up. In that, the lesson of the Gulf War stands stark. Men who surrendered to the Americans then were treated well; fed, not abused. And after the armistice was signed they were returned to Iraq, where many of them were killed by Saddam's government.

Any men considering surrender this time had to decide whether they believed we'd finish the job. If they didn't think so, then surrender would lead to their deaths. Not at our hands, but at the hands of the Baathists once they were repatriated.

What we're now seeing is the fact that more and more of the Iraqis are coming to believe that we truly are going to finish the job this time, and you're starting to see more public demonstration of support – but only after the local detachment of the fedayeen have been liquidated and it's safe to do so.

There's been support from the very beginning, of a different and far more critical kind. It's part of the reason that the much-dreaded city fighting has been going as well as it has, for instance. It isn't the mass of the Iraqi people who have been fighting against the invaders; it's been a small coterie of loyalists and they're also the ones who have been brutally repressing the locals all this time. They're hated and feared, and Iraqi civilians have been telling our soldiers where they are. In one high profile incident, a meeting of their leaders in Basra was given away to us, and we bombed the house they met in. And it's recently been publicized that one of our soldiers who was captured by Iraq was rescued because an Iraqi walked 8 miles to find some of our soldiers to tell them where she was. A lightning commando raid then was able to get her out.

The final phase of the war will be capture of Baghdad, and this has long been expected to be highly risky, with the greatest chance of huge American casualties and of combat endlessly prolonged. But the experience in other cities so far has been that the city fighting has been extremely one sided, with huge casualties among the armed Iraqi defenders and few for us, and the biggest reason why (in addition to our vastly superior training and equipment) has been because the locals have been giving us priceless intelligence about what the defenders plan and where they are located. If the people of Baghdad do the same, the battle for Baghdad may be much less difficult than many have feared, or secretly hoped, it would be.

The British are already demonstrating the modern way of city fighting in Basra, and it doesn't look like Stalingrad at all. You don't feed your infantry in to the meat grinder and fight house-to-house; you sit on the outside, infiltrate small groups of raiders, and rely heavily on intelligence. And the best weapon in that fighting has been the laser-guided bomb and not the rifle bullet. Most of Basra has now been captured with few British casualties.

Baghdad will be tougher; it's larger and there are more defenders. But that may only mean it will take longer. There's no reason to believe that the tactics the Brits have used in Basra won't also work in Baghdad, as long as we're patient. City fighting is a war of attrition, but with the proper tactics, the other side does almost all the attritting.