USS Clueless - Analysis II
     
     
 

Stardate 20030405.1155

(Reader's log): A week ago I posted an analysis of the war from a long time reader who is a retired military officer. He's sent me further commentary.

RECAP OF CURRENT SITUATION

After extensive air preparatory fires, the attack against Republican Guard forces around Baghdad is going well. Although the enemy force laydown is difficult to determine accurately, and some forces remain unlocated, Republican Guard forces have taken very heavy casualties, are in disarray, and unable to interfere effectively with coalition forces.

THE PLAN

Criticism of the battle plan appears to have muted somewhat, but two complaints (along with continued winges about supply lines) are:

1. The forces on the ground are too few/too light, and the 4th ID will be required to continue any ground campaign.

2. Stiff resistance caused a complete overhaul in the plan, and we're now on the second iteration.

As with previous naysaying, this is not convincing. Obviously the forces on the ground are heavy enough to win each battle fought so far, and CENTCOM did not feel the need to wait for the 4th ID prior to launching the current assault. It's also worth pointing out that most armchair (or retired) generals who claim light force structure essentially ignore Marine forces in their analysis--even though I MEF is a heavily reinforced division with integrated air support. There is also the very real issue of whether or not another division would be logistically supportable. When Basra is secure and a parallel supply line opened, the force can expand significantly. Until then, it's questionable.

Those who claim stiff resistance seem to have a vision of the original plan that envisions the 3rd ID marching into Baghdad and taking the city in a coup de main. Obviously there was never a chance of taking Baghdad by storm. Although there may have been a hope that the "shock and awe" campaign would cause a spontaneous regime collapse, it could hardly be an expectation. In planning parlance this is known as a "branch" or a "sequel" – an option in the basic plan designed to take advantage of an opportunity – but in this case, it's a road not taken. Finally, coalition supply lines are still long, but working. And whether due to convoying or air surveillance and attack, the Iraqis have not managed to disrupt them.

EXECUTION

The Republican Guard is largely routed or destroyed, and coalition forces are moving to complete the encirclement of Baghdad. The airport fight was interesting, but has little strategic impact other than psychological. Another benefit was that it enticed some Iraqi forces into a disastrous counterattack, though it's not clear if that was intended or luck. There is some concern that large numbers of Republican Guard troops are unaccounted for, but unless they remain a cohesive force, their military significance is dubious – and that appears unlikely.

There are reports of deep incursions into Baghdad, but that isn't likely. There have been several statements from CENTCOM and administration sources indicating an unwillingness to do so, and reports from inside the city denying a coalition presence. Incursions to show coalition presence and to take limited objectives are more probable and certainly more sound.

WHAT TO EXPECT

Unless there is a mass uprising, coalition forces cannot "storm" Baghdad – there is simply no way for a force that size to fight its way through a city of 5 million inhabitants. Unless CENTCOM planners take leave of their senses, they will encircle Baghdad and conduct a modified siege. They should also patrol and raid aggressively, as the British forces have done in Basra, to put pressure on the defenders.

It is also not feasible for political reasons to starve Baghdad into submission – but there is no need. Baghdad is a desert city, and the 5 million inhabitants cannot rely on the river to provide drinking water. The threat alone should be sufficient to demonstrate the hopelessness of the situation and compel surrender, and if not, short interruptions in electricity will disrupt supply (just as it did in Basra and Umm Qasr).

Expect coalition forces to establish supply depots in central Iraq, and if possible open up parallel supply routes through Umm Qasr, Basra, or both. Reinforcements will continue to flow and mop-up operations proceed. Some sporadic Iraqi attacks are possible, but they have little chance of mounting any serious threat to coalition initiative.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

The Saddamites are getting close to "use it or lose it" time for WMDs. Coalition forces are still not a very lucrative target, and the delivery systems are vulnerable to counter-battery fire or air attack, but they may feel it a risk worth taking. It remains a definite possibility. If they are used, the predominant casualties will be the citizens of Baghdad.

An implosion is more likely. The situation is deteriorating rapidly from the Iraqi viewpoint, and there is little reason to continue. Early signs would likely be a mass exodus from Baghdad and fighting among those remaining.

BOTTOM LINE

The CENTCOM plan appears to be on-track, and so far can only be called a success. The next few weeks will tell if it rates a "brilliant" qualifier.

I'm not so sure that a threat to food and water supplies would affect the hard core defenders. Th

Captured by MemoWeb from http://denbeste.nu/cd_log_entries/2003/04/AnalysisII.shtml on 9/16/2004