Stardate 20021108.1501

(On Screen): Anyone who thinks there's any kind of principle or nobility in international diplomacy should disabuse themselves of that idea right now. The reality is that when you negotiate, you don't get what's justified. You get what's cheap, and you get what you buy. There is no altruism or selflessness involved. If something is valuable then the price will be high, whether you deserve to get it or not.

There certainly was no principle involved in the UN process which led to unanimous passage by the UNSC of the resolution regarding Iraq. The key question was just how valuable passage of such a resolution would be to the Bush and Blair administrations; the continental Europeans entertained the fantasy that it might end up being extremely valuable and thus that they could use the threat of France's veto to try to wring substantial concessions out of President Bush. Occasionally in that kind of diplomatic process when there's a substantial disagreement about value you end up with an impasse, and the process will stall (sometimes for years) while events develop and make the value more clear, and in a sense that's what happened this time.

For instance, when Congress considered passage of an authorization for war under the War Powers Act, if it had included a requirement for UNSC approval (which was in fact proposed by some Democrats in the Senate) then France's veto in the UNSC would suddenly have taken on enormous value and thus France would have been in a position to dictate terms.

But France received a one-two punch, with passage of a Congressional authorization that did not require approval from the UN or anyone else (i.e. NATO or "consultation with allies"), followed by the Republican victory in the election. After that, it became obvious to everyone that France's veto had negligible value because a UN resolution had only minor value to Bush. In fact, what became clear was that if France (or Russia) had used their veto it would have harmed them far more than it would harm Bush. A French veto would have turned the UNSC into roadkill when Bush proceeded to war without it. So the process unstalled; France was permitted to ask for and get a face-saving cosmetic change, and then the resolution passed.

There's enormous difference of opinion in the news reports from commentators and the statements made by various politicians about whether the resolution just passed would require a second action by the UNSC before hostilities begin. My opinion on that is twofold:

1. It does not require a second UNSC resolution, but
2. When the time comes, we'll ask for one and get it. Rapidly.

I think that this is the deal that was worked out in private between Bush and Chirac in the phone call which led to passage of the resolution. Bush said he'd consult the UNSC again if and only if Chirac promised not to obstruct the process next time, and Bush made it clear that if there was any sign whatever of obstruction that he'd kiss off the UN entirely. With a congressional authorization for war in his pocket and a major electoral victory just behind him, this was no empty threat. Chirac, anxious to encourage at least the appearance of American multilateralism, has decided that it's better to give America what it wants than to try to stand up to us and by so doing prove that France and the UN are unimportant.

The US is going to do what it wants to do, but France can make it look multilateral by agreeing to American plans ahead of time. Any hope that France could actually alter American plans died Tuesday.

The administration is making very clear in all its commentary that it interprets this resolution as not requiring a second UNSC resolution. For instance, UN Ambassador John Negroponte told the UNSC itself the following:

The resolution makes clear that any Iraqi failure to comply is unacceptable and that Iraq must be disarmed. And one way or another Iraq will be disarmed. If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraq violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq.

In other words, we'll continue to work with you but only as long as you work with us. Cross us and you join the League of Nations on the ashheap of history. If indeed there was such a deal between Chirac and Bush, then this speech by Negroponte is a message to Paris that we won't put up with the same kind of crap next time. We will ask, but the answer better be "yes" and it better be fast. (And Bush himself has emphasized, yet again, that he does not feel bound.)

The reason why we'll ask when the time comes, and why we'll get what we want (a second resolution almost immediately authorizing war) is because it will be less important to us than to France and Russia. In reality, we'll be doing them a favor by asking, and everyone knows it.

There's been speculation about why Syria went along with it. That's actually pretty straightforward. If France's threat of veto turned out to be unimportant, a "no" vote or abstention by Syria was completely meaningless given that the other 14 members of the council all voted "yes". But if Syria had not voted "yes" that would have given the US something to point to later if we come i