Stardate 20021116.1603

(On Screen): Fredrik points me to this editorial in the Wapo by Ralph Peters, who states rather bluntly that last week's "leaks" of the military plan were quite deliberate and were intended in part to reassure both the Kurds and Marsh Arabs that we're genuinely committed this time, and also to try to scare the top brass in Iraq and hope to make them commit a coup.

That latter is quite a reasonable thing to hope for. Police state regimes like this are fragile; few serve out of loyalty. When the going gets tough, people in such a system start looking for exits. We out here in the public can't really know for sure just how close the Iraqi regime actually is to collapse (though there are indications that it's getting really close) but surely those who are planning this war will know much better through their sources.

So the plan which seems to be in place is to start small (relatively speaking, a force of perhaps 70,000 total which relies mainly on air power with ground muscle being provided more by the Marines than by the Army) with the hope that once we start to move the regime in Baghdad will collapse and we can capitalize on a power vacuum. If that does not happen, then General Franks would attempt to stabilize the situation and hold on while substantial ground forces were moved into the theater to restart the campaign along more conventional military lines. Peters thinks all the men for the larger option should be in place before the campaign begins.

Peters discounts the third alternative: that we actually know far more about where the top brass hide than they think we do, and that we'll actually be able to precipitate that collapse by killing the majority of them in the first couple of days of the bombing, most especially by bagging Saddam and his two sons. Since neither Peters nor I are privy to classified information, we can't really know, but it's a possibility that Peters should probably be aware of. (Which he may have deliberately neglected to mention, by the way.)

His main concern seems to be that if there actually is no collapse and actually is substantial resistance, that General Franks won't actually be permitted to get to the second stage because of political failure in Washington.

If Rumsfeld's elegant plan goes wrong and we do not have the forces on hand to reverse any unanticipated setbacks immediately, here is what will happen:

• The "world community" will cry out for a cease-fire.

• The president's political advisers will panic and ask how to cut their losses.

• Congress will begin instant recrimination over who lost the war -- even before the war is really lost.

• And a war that should be a relatively easy win for the United States will turn into a paralyzing embarrassment.

When you go to war, you go to win. The more complex the plan, the more likely it is to encounter difficulties.

I have enormous respect for Ralph Peters (I've talked about him on this page many times) but in this case I think he's underestimating President Bush. There's been a lot of that going around.

What is turning out to be the defining characteristic of Bush is that he doesn't panic. He knows that in the long run the only thing people really remember is how something ends, and that what may seem like setbacks during a process will be forgotten if the end is favorable. Who, now, remembers several weeks of bombing in Afghanistan last October 2001 where it seemed as if nothing was being accomplished? Who, now, remembers endless hand-wringing about paralysis in Washington last spring when we all feared that the administration had lost its way and was wimping out? Who remembers all the bitching and moaning over the summer about unilateralism and whether we should deal with the UN? Who even spends much time now thinking about October 2002, when it seemed as if going to the UNSC might have been a massive mistake which would derail the war as the US seemed locked in endless negotiations with intransigent Frenchmen?

I think that the single word which best describes Bush is unflappable. He takes the long view, and he doesn't sweat details, and he's not worried about what may seem like short-term setbacks. Unlike some presidents we've had, he doesn't watch his popularity polls week-to-week. He has his eye fixed firmly on the big picture and the long run, and knows full well that the best way to weather short term problems is to wait them out and the best way to deal with hysterical critics is to ignore them.

If indeed it turns out that the regime in Baghdad does not collapse once we move, and if it does turn out that there's substantial military resistance which can't be immediately overcome by the forces Franks has on hand, then there will indeed be criticism from Europe – and it will have just as much effect on Bush as all the other criticism from Europe over the last year.

Which is to say, none at all.

Remember all the bitching from Europe last year about Afghanistan, during the time before Kabul fell and the Taliban collapsed with stunning speed? Remember all the criticism, all the recriminations, all the warnings about quagmire? Remember the demands for cease-fires? Remember how it all got ignored, and how we stayed with the plan and won anyway?

Another thing that Bush understands is that those who jump in too early to decl