Stardate 20021117.1828

(Captain's log): Cheng writes:

I have to take slight issue with your latest post regarding the force size the US is likely to use against Saddam. First, it must be said that the effective use of a larger force would open up more options then a smaller one. At the very least, if we did get into difficulties in Iraq, the US would not be forced to wait in a stalemate for a week while the transports carrying reinforcements are steaming in from Savannah or Bremen (I am sorry, but if you want to move units from V Corp, you go by ship.). In fact, a larger force may be able to avoid the pitfalls which might stalemate a smaller force.

Secondly, unless you use an absurdly small force (Like a single battalion-sized Marine Expeditionary Unit and a 72-aircraft Air Force Tactical Fighter Wing suddenly sweeping down on Saddam's command bunker one night.), there is not much more benefit in terms of public relations to the rest of the world in choosing to go with smaller rather then larger force. In fact, it can be argued that a more useful lesson for the world to draw is that if you mess with the US, we _will_ bring down the largest hammer we can fashion upon you, and certainly more then you can dismiss on the assumption "They got lucky." It will certainly ram home the message "Don't mess with America" better then the alternatives. "We are going to come at you with a hammer so large that nothing you can do can even scratch it as we swat you down..."

Thirdly, while the size of the forces is determined by how long you have to build-up, there is no decisive reason why you should go with a smaller force over one as large as possible. If nothing else, a larger effective force is likely to take smaller number of casualties because it can do things smaller forces can not or avoid doing things a smaller force has to (How many troops are you planning to deal with POWs and where are you going to get them, for example?). In this sense, what we should be arguing is not economy of force, but economy of friendly casualties, which is usually on the side of the larger side. This is not including smaller Iraqi military and civilian casualties as well, since the idea of making a stand might not be as appealing if the American force coming at you is a mechanized infantry brigade, rather then a Marine rifle company.

(Others have written expressing similar sentiments.)

These things are all true as general principles, but all military planning is a combination of the general and the specific, and there are some practical aspects of this particular war in this particular theater which affect this calculation.

For one thing, though we hope it isn't true, we have to realize that there's a small chance that Saddam actually has a small number of working nukes. And while he would have a serious problem delivering such a weapon given our clear intention to control the air, it's still a matter of probabilities. A small chance of a nuke multiplied by a small chance of successful delivery is a really small chance, but the results of such an attack could be significant enough so that it has to be included in the planning process.

If we wanted to put 250,000 men into the theater, most of which would be ground forces, before operations begin then the majority of them would have to start in Kuwait. At this point it's looking as if we can't rely on Turkey as a staging point, and the idea of staging in Israel and crossing Jordan is really terrible for at least three reasons: no reasonable place in Israel to do it, dramatic security problems while there, and the fact that Jordan is unlikely to cooperate.

So if we put 200,000 men into Kuwait, they're going to be relatively concentrated. One of the characteristics of this entire buildup for war has been that our military planners have been actively working to make sure we don't have any significant concentrations anywhere. This would change all that.

They would be far more vulnerable to chemical attack, for one thing. If they all were in a major area, it would be a target sufficiently large to actually be hit by a Scud. And, as mentioned, there's a small chance of them getting nuked.

The chance of that may well be lower than 1%, but if it did happen it would be a catastrophe. Until we know for sure that there's no chance of that kind of attack on our men, we'll have to continue to work to make sure we don't have any significant concentrations of men within reach of Iraq until the last possible instant.

In the modified scenario where we start with a smaller force and hope for a quick and easy win, and build up of that doesn't happen, the benefit is that we will already have taken a substantial part of Iraq itself before the second buildup. We'll have captured Basra, and will be able to use its port and airports, and we'll have substantially more territory to work with and can create a larger force without a higher concentration of men to become a "high value target" for a major area-effect weapon.

And while it's true that it's not a good thing to plan on the enemy doing what you want them to do, in this case there are multiple ways that things could go well.

The Iraqi army could largely decide to sit it out. (I think this likely.)

The initial bombing could kill the majority of Iraq's leaders.

There could be a coup, or a collapse of morale in top places leading to a lot of brass heading for the exits.

Any one of these alone would be enough; two or more would make it far easier. So it's not really a qu