Stardate 20021002.1536

(Captain's log): Rob Salkowitz writes:

A lot of my views on the subject of Arab politics were shaped by a devastatingly great book called "The Closed Circle" by David Pryce-Jones. I would not be surprised if you're familiar with it, since your arguments follow along the same lines. [I'm afraid I've never heard of it. — SCDB] That said, I don't come to the same conclusions as you do about the inevitability of war. I think you give short shrift to the reform option, wherein these societies will, one by one, reach a tipping point and internalize the values that you think need to be imposed at the point of a rifle. It is already happening in places like Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, though it is hampered there by plain old modern venality and corruption more than anything else. As these states mature, however, the example of self-driven success will spread through the Arab world and we will have the pride/shame dynamic working for us rather than against us.

The only problem with that is that the process is too slow, and as of last year we no longer have the luxury of time.

If we wait for that process to reform them, a lot more of us will die in the mean time, especially if they get nuclear weapons before reaching that tipping point. That's a price I'm not willing to pay.

If you're skeptical, remember that there is historical precedent. Ataturk was able to build a modern state in the rotted-out stump of the Ottoman Empire, and though Turkey has its own problems, they are manifestly different from those of the Arab world. The Shah of Iran tried it, but lacked Ataturk's gifts. It remains to be seen if Musharif can be the Ataturk of Pakistan (where, don't fool yourself, there are plenty of crazies waiting to get their hands on the nukes). (and yes, I know, none of these are Arab countries. Nevertheless, they share some important similarities). WW II-era Japan is also a misplaced analogy. Both it and Nazi Germany were modern states, though twisted ones. Japan emerged from medievalism under its own steam under the Meiji Emperor of the 1860s-80s, when the shame of backwardness finally collapsed the rigid Tokugawa traditionalist state.

There's no question that the process you describe is going on now, and that it would eventually produce the kind of transition I desire in their culture. But left to itself it will take decades, and during that period we would still be the target for future terrorist attacks.

Finally, I have to mention that the colonialist enterprise failed categorically in the Middle East, even when it was undertaken by professionals like the French and the Brits. I'm not sure what makes you think we would fare any better, or would be willing/able to bear the costs for the extended period it would take.

In part it's because we've been successful at it in the past (in Japan). In part it's because we really don't have any choice but to try, even if the prospect of success is dismal.

And in part because we're going to have an entirely different goal in the process than the French and British did. They were trying to create colonies they could exploit, and to inculcate in the people there the virtues and behavior needed for what amounts to national slavery. We'll be trying to do what we did in Japan, to inculcate them with the virtues necessary to create a more modern and liberal society where they will rule themselves.

We didn't try to exploit Japan, we just reformed it; and the people of Japan actually did benefit enormously. We didn't make slaves out of them, we made them friends and partners, and after the reform process was complete we treated them as equals. That's really quite a lot different, and a difference in goals will necessarily alter the means used and the likelihood of success. And it will help enormously that we're going to be trying to push them in a direction they're already going on their own. We won't be trying to change their course, we'll be trying to make them follow their existing course much more rapidly.

I might also mention that your argument is similar to the one made about our military intervention in Afghanistan last year: The British couldn't ultimately win wars there, and the Russians couldn't, either. What makes you arrogant Americans think you're better than they are, and can succeed where they failed?

Because we are better, which is why we did succeed. We won in 6 weeks what the Russians couldn't win in 8 years.

At the very least, we're a lot better at war than the British were in the 19th century or the Russians in the 1980's, whether we're better in any other ways. The British didn't have telecommunications and long range bombers, and the Russians didn't have flexibility and imagination and precision guided munitions.

And because the circumstances were radically different. For instance, when the Russians fought in Afghanistan, we were giving the Mujahadeen logistical support. But when we fought in Afghanistan, nobody important was giving the Taliban logistical support.

It's important to study the lessons of history, but it's also important to know when they don't apply, and to recognize that it's possible to succeed where others have failed if circumstances have changed or if the tools available have improved, and especially if the goals are different. The fact that the British and French were not able to mode