Stardate 20020214.1504

(On Screen): When I read European editorials about American foreign policy and the current war, sometimes I think I'm watching an episode of "The Blind Men and the Elephant". It's almost like everyone sees what they want to see.

There are a number of European concerns: that American military threats may actually strengthen hardliners in the “axis” countries; that broadening the war will wreck the impressive international coalition so painstakingly built in support of the Afghan campaign; and that America is rejecting the multilateral approach it seemed to accept in the immediate aftermath of the September 11th attacks.

That coalition was most impressive for its softness, its lack of dedication and commitment, and its utter impermanence. And if there was any sign of America accepting multilateralism during the last five months, I sure must have missed it. Where were the allied troops in Afghanistan? Some few were offered and the offer was rejected. French troops (a couple hundred of them) flew to Uzbekistan and cooled their heels there because the US refused to grant them permission to enter Afghanistan. Some nations sent a paltry few warships to the waters off Pakistan but they were not needed and did nothing once they arrived. France's aircraft carrier arrived, but only after combat had largely ceased, and if we've trusted them to actually make any bombing missions since then I sure haven't heard of it. They might as well have stayed home.

In fact what was most notable about the war was its unilateralism. There was no military coalition in any meaningful sense. Or rather, there was a coalition, but its members were not from Europe (with the notable exception of the UK). But it was not, and it was never intended to be, any kind of permanent alliance to prosecute the entire war. (Surely the Afghan Northern Alliance would not be expected to commit to fighting in Iraq or in the jungles of the Philippines.) It was a temporary contrivance for purposes of dealing with and only with the operation in Afghanistan itself, and its primary members were nations from central Asia. It has now fulfilled that purpose. If we decide on operations somewhere else, we'll create a new coalition for that.

For example, if the US decides on a ground war in Iraq, there will unquestionably be a coalition formed for that. Who would be in it? Ideally, Turkey, Kuwait and Qatar and possibly the UK; maybe also Saudi Arabia but that is looking increasingly unlikely. Of those, the most important one is Qatar, and even it isn't essential. It's doubtful that anyone else would even be welcome, though they might be permitted a token involvement to save face. It's not that we want to snub anyone, it's just that anyone else would just be in the way. The political entanglements involved with European participation would far outweigh any advantages they could bring militarily; it isn't worth it.

What I think was happening is that the European politicians were noting the usual American lack of unity and seizing on those parts of it which most pleased them, and then assuming (or hoping) that those parts represented the mainstream here. There are always disagreements and arguments in the US; we never do anything without dissent and discussion. It's the strongest and most healthy aspect of our system. But it can be very confusing to people outside our borders who don't really understand our ways.

There were people inside and outside the government who did talk about coalitions and multilateralism. But they were on the margin. What the European politicians don't seem to have been successful at is differentiating between the main message and intent of the US government over the last few months and the voices of those who dissent. Within our system we know that dissenting voices are important, but most of our dissenters also accept that after a fair hearing a decision has to take place and we have to choose a single path and get on with it. The multilateralist voices lost this one, and they accepted it. Sadly, our foreign friends didn't realize it.

Or perhaps this is just more smokescreen, more use of rhetoric. A lot of the use of the word "coalition" has been an attempt to lay a guilt trip on the United States, and so far it's been largely futile in doing so. Secretary of State Powell has on occasion mouthed comforting words to the Europeans about coalition, but our acts have made clear that the one thing we do not accept is that a coalition should be permitted to prevent us from doing what we decide we need to do. And that is exactly what the European politicians have been hoping that a coalition would accomplish; I have never yet seen any European politician in the last month talk about the coalition except in the context of trying to restrain American actions. Given such a disparity in interpretation of what a coalition is, how can there be said to have been one?

So the blind European politicians have been feeling the US elephant and have decided that it is just like a rope, or a tall tree, or a spear (or that it is soft and mushy). Somehow or other they seem to have missed that the US is not an elephant. It's a tiger, and it's pissed. (Or perhaps they know that all too well, and are trying to pretend otherwise.)